## NC

Backsliding on environmental reforms undermines the credibility of Chinese president Xi Jinping.

**Hilton 13** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

There was not much cheer for environmentalists in the meeting that was billed as the most significant of Xi Jinping's administration. At the close of the Chinese Communist Party's Third Plenum on November 13, China's official news agency, Xinhua, failed even to list the environment among its key points, focusing instead on the promise of economic reform. **Xi** has recognized that prioritizing economic growth for 30 years has brought China to the edge of environmental collapse and he has **promised to give environment the same weight as** economic **development.** But 2013 was a year of dramatically worsening air pollution and mounting public frustration at the government's apparent inability to halt China's deforestation, maritime pollution, desertification and water and soil pollution. Xi said China must build what it calls "ecological civilization" -- a top-level slogan that officials are still struggling to flesh out. **He** talked of "establishing a complete system" of ecological civilization, **promised to improve** the **management of natural resources, and to establish "red lines" in ecological protection**, along with ecological compensation for pollution victims. It is **how these** and other **promises shape up** that **will decide Xi's** environmental **legacy.** So far, his government has announced plans to clean up lethal air pollution but they will take many years to take effect. In other respects, environmental protection risks clashing with other concerns: **a new** Environmental Protection **Law** that is **moving** slowly **through China's parliament** threatens serious financial penalties for polluting companies, but **has** also **been heavily criticized for restricting** the rights of NGOs to take **legal action against polluters, as Xi tightens** the **state**'s **control** of civil society. It also plays a role in the rising incidence of protest and chronic rural poverty, which President Xi has promised to reverse. The environment could benefit from Xi's commitment to a greater role for the market, which might boost China's pilot carbon-trading schemes, and from his promise of a stronger legal system and greater transparency. **High-level promises set the policy direction, but Xi's environmental record will be judged by results.** Key issues include cleaning up China's Environmental Impact Assessments, boosting the Ministry of Environmental Protection and putting it in charge of the provincial and local bureaus, building a robust, legally enforced system of fines for polluters and lifting restrictions on China's tightly controlled environmental NGOs.

Xi’s leadership is key to prop up the CCP.

**Qinglian 11-27** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

Many observers see Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping alternately offending leftists, rightists, and princelings (the offspring of China’s founding generation) and believe he is still looking to find his way. These observers misunderstand Xi’s position, which is in fact independent of and superior to these factions. **The CCP has always strongly suppressed the liberals** (known in China as the “rightists”), **who advocate constitutionalism.** When Xi suppressed them, whether or not they were upset was irrelevant. The leftists have a history of going to any ends for their own interests. In the past few years, when they went too far and crossed the line with the CCP, the authorities cracked down on them. But leftists did not see it as offensive. They just adjusted themselves and refrained from saying things the authorities did not want to hear so they could make a comeback. Now, although former Politburo member and leftist leader Bo Xilai has been imprisoned, the website of the political movement Utopia is still up. And as long as the leftists continue to criticize universal values, constitutional democracy with foreign capital, and other anti-China forces, they will continue to feel that they are somewhat useful and will take the initiative to get close to Xi. At one time, only the princelings’ support mattered, as they could actually affect Beijing’s politics. When the founding fathers were alive, in some critical periods, they could even influence the political choices of the highest authorities, such as in 1978. However, whether or not the princelings—or the red second generation, to which the princelings and descendants of high-ranking elders belong—support Xi doesn’t matter anymore. The recent conference marking the birth centenary of Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun, regarded as a landmark event, proved this. Xi Ascendant The offspring of China’s elite showed their submission to the general secretary by attending the event, even if some still felt dissatisfied. Xi Zhongxun was a key leader during the Cultural Revolution. The commemoration of his 100-year birth date was organized by Xi Jinping personally, so it included both the public and private spheres. Those attending the event at Beijing’s Great Hall naturally came from high levels of society. Various children of senior statesmen (including Bo Xilai’s allies) attended the celebration in order to show their allegiance to the new monarch. Offspring of China’s elite who were not invited were disappointed. Through this celebration, **Xi** Jinping demonstrated that he **possesses the** solid and undeniable **authority that neither** former leaders Jiang **Zemin nor Hu Jintao** truly **acquired.** Xi Jinping’s personal dictatorship has replaced predecessor Hu Jintao’s era of “collective leadership.” Among the offspring of China’s elite, Xi is considered one of the youngest. In a few years, these offspring of China’s elite, who still serve in the government or military, will be past the age of 70. The influence of this circle will increasingly weaken as they retire or pass away. The red third generation is currently just starting in politics from the county office and up. They still have a long road to travel from the provincial and ministerial levels up the political hierarchy. If the second generation wants the third generation to smoothly succeed them and continue to have political influence, they definitely cannot antagonize Xi Jinping and must humbly serve him as a representative of the descendants of high-level officials. Princelings’ Mindset The chief emphasis of Xi’s banner slogan, the so-called Chinese Dream, is still for the country to gain wealth and for its military to become stronger—it is the same as in Mao’s time. Xi hopes to clean up “spiritual pollution” and to unify public opinion in accordance with the “Mao-style” of thinking. The “Chinese Dream” is also directed against Western ideology in order to help maintain the one-party dictatorship. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign targets serious corruption among the bureaucracy. All of this just makes one point clear: **Xi** Jinping **wishes to use Mao’s iron rule to safeguard China’s crony capitalism.** However, the princelings believe that they should be entitled to enjoy the wealth of crony capitalism, but that bureaucrats with civilian backgrounds should not. Though CCP newspapers and other mouthpieces would not reveal this attitude, it became very apparent during Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s second term, when the offspring of China’s elite became very active in Beijing’s politics. In March and April of 2010, the British Financial Times successively published several articles on China’s princelings, including “Red-Blooded Veterans Versus Ruthless Arrivistes.” One section in the latter highlighted the conflict between the new and old princelings: “The term ‘princeling’ was coined to refer specifically to the children of senior leaders of China’s communist revolution—the veterans who joined Mao Zedong on the fabled Long March or were members of the inner circle at the time of the 1949 communist victory. “Today it is used more broadly to include the offspring of later generations of technocratic leaders [the two generations of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao]—but a distinction remains between them and the truly “red-blooded” revolutionary families … especially since there is a recent precedent of senior leaders cracking down on the business activities of their predecessors’ children. “When he was consolidating his power in the early 1990s, Jiang Zemin, former president, shut down companies and arrested a number of business executives with close ties to Deng’s children.” The article also noted, “The old revolutionary royalty, like the family of Deng Xiaoping, are still untouchable and they regard this country as belonging to them in a very real sense.” The reporter stated that the information was provided by Beijing insiders. I believe it because only people in that circle would despise the authorities born as technocrats so intensely. Evidence of this rift is found by looking at the invitees to the recent centenary commemoration. Many offspring of revolutionary families attended, including the widow and son of Gao Gang, who was purged by Mao long ago. Xi Jinping feels a sense of kinship with them. By contrast, no media outlets reported news of members of new princelings getting an invitation to the activity. If there were, media outlets from Hong Kong wouldn’t have missed it. The Southern People Weekly published an interview on Nov. 6 with Marshal Chen Yi’s son Chen Xiaolu and Ma Wenrui’s daughter Ma Xiaoli, who, in recent years has become an active representative of the offspring of China’s elite due to her close ties with the Xi family. Those whom the Financial Times called the “new princelings,” Ma Xiaoli referred to as the “second generation of officials,” saying, “We are not like them; a line should be drawn!” “Most of the offspring of China’s elite have little power or money!” “We too hate the corruption and the wild and arrogant second generation officials as well. We cannot let these people ruin the Party.” Xi’s Mission By understanding the mindset of the offspring of China’s elite, one will grasp that Xi **Jinping’s mission is to preserve the one-party dictatorship. His anti-corruption campaigns** mainly target bureaucracy and **are necessary to maintain the CCP’s ability to govern.** **The CCP** has done that before. Even in the past 10-plus years, it **has sacked dozens of** provincial and ministerial level **officials** with civilian origins, some even coming from impoverished families. As for the outside world’s belief that Xi is wavering back and forth between leftists and rightists, this observation is superficial. I believe **this is Xi’s way of warning** the **different political factions that he alone will decide China’s future** political path, that he knows what he’s doing, and that no one should try to influence him.

CCP rule causes extinction.

**Jin 9** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

**Over the past 100 years,** there have been all sorts of **autocracies** which have **ruthlessly suppressed human rights.** They brought tremendous tragedy to human society, and created disaster and shame for the entire world. **They** have come to **mark the most miserable pages in human history.** To focus more closely on the factors leading up to these tragedies, we find that all of them are directly linked with conflicts and antagonism between the fundamental concepts of human values. Human society has been treading prudently between conflicts of such contrasting values as liberty and slavery, human rights and oppression, democracy and autocracy, peace and war, etc. These threats that people have had to face in the past have still not been eliminated today, nearly 20 years after the end of the Cold War. Despotism, which used to be symbolised together with anti-civilisation and anti-humanitarianism, has succeeded in concealing its hegemony seeking ambition with money, thus deceiving a contemporary world which has been tainted by material interests, and consequently breeding a new kind of evil. This world is far from becoming more secure and harmonious. Those who harm mankind, **those who create lethal weapons, and those** who stoop to the lowest debasement of human morality by **practicing terrorism - such authoritarian regimes are pervading the** civilised **world**, and international society is merely appeasing them during the change of world hierarchy. The “conflict of civilisations” horror typified by the example of September 11 is a genuine affront to our most basic human concept of "core values" by those totalitarian regimes. International society has neglected another threat which has more horrendous implications to the existence of mankind than the ostensible conflict between Islamic and non-Islamic cultures. Communist China, the colossal despotic stronghold and the ultimate base of the largest number of international terrorists, has been the biggest beneficiary from this crisis, by dividing and seizing economic dominion over the world. In the midst of the financial tsunami which is currently exacerbating the issues facing the world economy, international leadership standards of ethics and behaviour are degenerating. The fortresses of fundamental values have been hastily abandoned by developed nations. Democracies have failed to examine their own short-sightedness in hastily embracing the totalitarian China as Messiah when dealing with their critical economic dilemmas. Due to the enormous economic interests, and the surrender of the idea of liberty in the West, Western democracies are continually making strategic mistakes with disastrous long term ramifications. International society has been compromising and appeasing the Chinese Communist Government, enabling it to grasp at its last efforts for survival, almost 20 years after the collapse of the entire communist camp. In China, **the communist authority has been** doggedly **obstructing** political **reform, and** has been **crushing all** political **dissent by force.** Although the social atmosphere in China is already full of resentment and there have been isolated resistances where society has tried to defend its rights, it is very difficult to form an effective tide of democratic reform to reflect the true aspirations of the Chinese people. Therefore, Chinese people, who represent one quarter of the entire human race, still have not been able to break free from despotism and slavery. To serve their own self interests for continued autocratic rule and international expansion, **the Chinese Communist Party has long been** providing either overt or clandestine support to its North Korean ally, **making North Korea the most volatile “powder keg” which could inflict war** at any time **on**to **a** generally **peaceful** and reluctant **human race.** Because of the Chinese communist government’s diplomatic repression, the highly democratised Republic of China in Taiwan is still isolated in the international environment: the Republic of China in Taiwan is continually facing the threat of communist annexation and military intimidation, and is bulldozed by the communists in all areas, such as economy, trade, culture and international communication, even though the Republic of China in Taiwan has itself achieved progress in socio-politics, economy, culture, education, environment and ecology. After enduring under the ruling of the Chinese Communist Party for half a century, Tibet is facing the crisis of erosion of its “national identity”. The former Shangri-la, the last pure land in the world, has already been diminished to being “a living hell on earth”. Because of the policy of repression and the siege mentality of the Chinese communist authorities, the Free Tibet movement, under the leadership of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, is still a long way from their political aspiration, which is true autonomy for Tibet. The Chinese democratic movement, fuelled with the objective of bringing an end to the sole leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, in favour of democracy and constitutional politics in China, has been fighting hard towards its goal. Although the objectives of this great democratic movement are to eliminate the threat of autocracy and to promote world civilisation, it has not attracted attention and support from international leaders, and, consequently, is facing difficulties in making any progress. As long as Chinese communist despotism continues to exist, it will continue to be the cause of more human rights tragedies in the China, in Taiwan and Tibet, and will pose potential threats to peace in the Asia Pacific region. We believe that the world should become acutely aware of this alarming crisis and pay more attention to how they respond to China with regards to the long term global implications. It is impossible for China, a super-nation, to experience a systematic transition to a democratic society without the aid and participation of the broader international community. **The fate of China is more and more intertwined with the rest of the world in** this **rapid**ly developing contemporary **globalisation.** **Therefore, China’s future represents a massive influence on the future of [hu]mankind**, changing China is changing the world, **and the key** to this process **is** the promotion and awareness of the priorities of **the Chinese democratic movement.** It is essential for the Chinese democratic movement, the Free Tibet movement, democratic Taiwan and all forces of justice, liberty and democracy in the rest of the world to co-operate sincerely and effectively, to form a robust political alliance to restrain the global expansion of the Communist China. It is crucial for international society to realise that only by supporting and accelerating China’s democratisation and promoting its political reform can the situation of China be changed to improve global peace and stability. We expect that in the near future, that is, around the 100th anniversary of the Revolution of 1911, China, the land which has endured under communism, will have a democratic and federated new China. Perhaps a new historical chapter is to be initiated here. Chinese history and world history will be written by our generation. **Only if China changes** from insulation to openness, autocracy **to democracy, will the future** world **be secure and peaceful.**

## Weighing

A. Probability – East Asia is the highest risk for nuclear war

**Dibb 1** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

The **areas of maximum danger** and instability in the world **today are in Asia**, followed by the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union. **The strategic situation in Asia is more uncertain and** potentially **threatening than anywhere** in Europe. Unlike in Europe, **it is possible to envisage war in Asia involving the major powers**: remnants of Cold War ideological confrontation still exist **across the Taiwan Straits and on** the **Korea**n Peninsula; **India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons** and ballistic missiles, and these two countries are more confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s; in Southeast Asia, Indonesia—which is the world’s fourth-largest country—faces a highly uncertain future that could lead to its breakup. The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense (about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world except the United States and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military spenders. **Asia** also **has more nuclear powers than any other region of the world.** Asia’s **security is at a crossroads**: the region could go in the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into confrontation and military conflict. There are positive tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy, which would encourage an optimistic view. But there are a number of negative tendencies that must be of serious concern. There are deep-seated historical, territorial, ideological, and religious differences in Asia. Also, the region has no history of successful multilateral security cooperation or arms control. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be ineffective when confronted with major crises.

B. Scope – Chinese authoritarianism spills over globally.

**Friedman 9** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

Democracy-promoter Larry Diamond concludes in his recent book The Spirit of Democracy that **democracy is in trouble across the world because of the rise of China, an authoritarian superpower that has the economic clout to back and bail out authoritarian regimes around the globe.** “Singapore . . . could foreshadow a resilient form of capitalist-authoritarianism by China, Vietnam, and elsewhere in Asia,” which delivers “booming development, political stability, low levels of corruption, affordable housing, and a secure pension system.” Joined by ever richer and more influential petro powers leveraging the enormous wealth of Sovereign Investment Funds, “**Asia will determine the fate of democracy**,” at least in the foreseeable future. **Authoritarian China**, joined by its authoritarian friends, **is well on the way to defeating the global forces of democracy.**

## Democracy Impact

CCP collapse is key to Chinese democratic transition – history proves.

**MacFarquhar 6** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

In the Maoist era, that system was held together by an undisputed leader, a well-disciplined and relatively uncorrupt party, and a doctrine (Marxism-Leninism-Maoism) that gave the Communists the authority to impose Mao Zedong's policies. **Underpinning the whole system were the** soldiers of the **P**eople's **L**iberation **A**rmy. **But,** selflessness, and confidence were undermined by the assaults **it suffered** dur**in**g **the Cultural Revolution.** Afterward, its doctrine was effectively abandoned as part of Deng Xiaoping's reform program. As a result, **in** the 1989 **Tiananmen Square** massacre, **the party proved to be** politically **impotent** and the military had to save the day. Today, China is far richer and the party is co-opting potential opponents, but as Pei shows, **corruption is greater, contempt for legal processes is widespread, and the willingness of China's citizens to protest is increasing every day.** Nobody believes that President Hu Jintao could play the role of imperial ruler to hold the system together. **What could turn this "decaying" system in a more hopeful direction?** The **history** of China's 150-year struggle with modernity **suggests it may require a major shock to the ruling establishment. This first happened** in the war of 1894-95, **when Japan defeated China.** Although the Qing dynasty had suffered defeats to the British and the French earlier in the same century, the Japanese victory was far more traumatic because Beijing thought of its island neighbors as junior partners in the great enterprise of Chinese civilization. In victory, Japan was different. It was a European-style nation state that had proved itself superior to China. **The effect** of this defeat **was dramatic. China's leaders adopted radical reforms**, Confucianism was abandoned as the state doctrine, **and**, in 1912, **the** 2,000-year-old **imperial system was replaced by a republic.** It was the first great revolution of the 20th century.

Democracy is key to solve extinction.

**Diamond 95** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion **[democracies] do not go to war with one another.** They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and **they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another.** **They do not build w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction **to use on or** to **threaten one another.** Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. **They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens**, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. **Precisely because**, within their own borders, **they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which** a new world order of **international security** and prosperity **can be built.**

## Relations Impact

Chinese democracy is key to US-China relations and non-prolif.

**Ting 4** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

In order **to have a friendly China** in that strategic region of Asia**, the U**nited **S**tates **needs** to have **a government in Beijing advocating a free society and democratic** political s**ystem. That's the** kind of **government the US wants and needs to deal with. With a democratic China** on the other side of Pacific Ocean, **America's strategy to maintain security and expand commercial interests would be greatly enhanced.** And it is not an impossible mission to ask the communist government to loosen its grip of absolute power over the Chinese people, when already Beijing's communist leaders are becoming more moderate with each generation. With the added pressure of calls from Hong Kong and Taiwan for justice and democracy, direct suffrage for all Chinese people should not be unattainable in the foreseeable future. If the current US administration could make good use of its special Taiwan leverage to coordinate a successful package of an authentic "one China" policy with a democratic and market-valued system in China, then **a unified Taiwan and China would become the best ally for the US in** terms of **protecting human rights and curbing** or halting **nuclear** weapon **prolif**eration. **A democratic China would be transformed from a strategic competitor to a friendly partner.**

US-China relations are comparatively the most important for solving every existential threat

**Cohen and Greenberg 9** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

The **evolution of Sino-U.S. relations** over the next months, years, and decades **has the potential to have a greater impact on global security** and prosperity **than any other** bilateral or multilateral **arrangement**. In this sense, many analysts consider the US.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. **Without question,** strong and **stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for** the protection and **promotion of** U.S. and **global interests.** Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of **U.S.-China relations will determine** the success, or failure, of efforts to address **the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonprolif**eration, **and terrorism**, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually **no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China coop**eration. The uncertainty of that future trajectory and the "strategic mistrust" between leaders in Washington and Beijing necessarily concerns many experts and policymakers in both countries. Although some U.S. analysts see China as a strategic competitor—deliberately vying with the United States for energy resources, military superiority, and international political influence alike— analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has generally found that China uses its soft power to pursue its own, largely economic, international agenda primarily to achieve its domestic objectives of economic growth and social stability.1 Although Beijing certainly has an eye on Washington, not all of its actions are undertaken as a counterpoint to the United States. In addition, CSIS research suggests that growing Chinese soft power in developing countries may have influenced recent U.S. decisions to engage more actively and reinvest in soft-power tools that have atrophied during the past decade. To the extent that there exists a competition between the United States and China, therefore, it may be mobilizing both countries to strengthen their ability to solve global problems. To be sure, U.S. and Chinese policy decisions toward the respective other power will be determined in large part by the choices that leaders make about their own nations interests at home and overseas, which in turn are shaped by their respective domestic contexts. Both parties must recognize—and accept—that the other will pursue a foreign policy approach that is in its own national interest. Yet, **in a globalized world, challenges are increasingly transnational**, and so too must be their solutions. **As demonstrated by** the rapid spread of **SARS** from China in 2003, **pandemic flu can** be **spread rapidly through air** and via international travel. Dust particulates from Asia settle in Lake Tahoe. An **economic downturn in one country can** and does **trigger** an economic **slowdown in another.** These challenges can no longer be addressed by either containment or isolation. What constitutes the national interest today necessarily encompasses a broader and more complex set of considerations than it did in the past As a general principle, the United States seeks to promote its national interest while it simultaneously pursues what the CSIS Commission on Smart Power called in its November 2007 report the "global good."3 This approach is not always practical or achievable, of course. But neither is it pure benevolence. Instead, a strategic **pursuit of the global good accrues** concrete benefits for the United States (and others) in the form of building confidence, **legitimacy, and political influence in key** countries and **regions around the world** in ways that enable the United States to better confront global and transnational challenges. In short, the global good comprises those things that all people and governments want but have traditionally not been able to attain in the absence of U.S. leadership. Despite historical, cultural, and political differences between the United States and China, Beijing's newfound ability, owing to its recent economic successes, to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between the two countries. Today there is increasing recognition that no major global challenge can be addressed effectively, much less resolved, without the active engagement of—and cooperation between—the United States and China.

## AT CCP Good (Lashout)

CCP lashout is temporary at best and won’t escalate.

**Zakaria 8** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

So why doesn't the Chinese regime see this? Beijing has a particular problem. Now that communism is dead, **the Communist Party sees its legitimacy as linked to** its role in promoting and **defending Chinese nationalism. It is especially clumsy when it comes to such issues.** Clever technocrats though they are, China's **communist leaders**—mostly engineers—have not had to refine their political skills as they have their economic touch. In the past they **have stoked anti-Japanese and anti-American outbursts, only to panic that things were getting out of control and then reverse course.** They fear that compromising over Tibet would set a precedent for the unraveling of the Chinese nation. **China has grown and shrunk** in size over the centuries, and its dynasties have often been judged by their success in preserving the country's geography.

CCP instability doesn’t cause lashout – empirics prove.

**Newmyer 7** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

Recent history bears out the continuing relevance of this advice in China. Under Mao and Deng, as Iain Johnston argues, the PRC proved remarkably prone to escalate against other powers. In its first half-century, **at moments of** domestic **tumult and** in periods of **calm alike - from the end of the Civil War through the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the height of the Cultural Revolution to the** relatively **tranquil** mid-19**90s** - **the PRC launched unexpected military operations against the U.S., India, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and the Philippines.** The principal aim of each action was to secure a concrete gain or decisively defeat a foreign power. As Beijing continues to navigate domestic challenges, then, U.S. policy makers would be wise to keep in mind that **internal disorder** itself **has not disposed the PRC to peace or** triggered **aggression.** Rather, the PRC has tended to strike when a rival's guard is perceived to be down, offering an opportunity to inflict a devastating blow.

Democratic transition ensures peace better.

**Hyde 2** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

As **for East Asia, the stakes posed by China's rapid development could not be higher. The peaceful**, prosperous, and benevolent **system the U.S. has** created and **sustained** for over half a century, **that network of uncoerced relationships** that forms the foundation for the region's embrace of the modern world and the betterment of the lives of hundreds of millions of its people, **could be torn apart by a powerful China bent on domination.** But instead of assaulting it, **a democratic China would very likely** seek to **join that system, for it represents an open door to a new world**, one which can guarantee that China's miraculous transformation will continue and allow the Chinese people to assume their rightful place among the free nations of the world.

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